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The Rise and Fall (and Rise Again) of Vernacular 
Happiness 1
Haiyan Lee
Departments of East Asian Languages and Cultures and Comparative Literature
Stanford University
Mandarins, Bohemians, and Plebeians
At the beginning of Carma Hinton’s classic documentary 
(1984) about gender relations in Chinese society, a male voice 
explains, over the image of a pair of ruddy-cheeked little boy and girl 
munching on snacks and loitering along a low brick wall, that the 
birth of a boy is “a big happiness” and that of a girl is “a small 
happiness.” The next shot reveals the source of the voice: a jovial 
middle-aged farmer sitting on a low stool in a courtyard. The word he 
uses for “happiness” is xi 喜. The reason he gives for the distinction 
between big and small is familiar: sons stay in the family to carry on 
the family name (and often the family enterprise as well) and provide 
old-age care; daughters marry out and owe little moral or economic 
obligations to their natal families. The patrilineal character of the 
kinship system was the structural determinant of women’s debased 
status in traditional China. 
1 I would like to thank Kathryn Pothier, Robert Pothier, Amitav Ghosh, 
and Daniel Bell for being the first readers and commentators of this 
paper, and Melissa Dale, Becky Hsu, Hsiao-yen Peng 彭小妍, and 
Weijie Song 宋偉傑 for inviting me to present this paper at their 
respective institutions. I’m especially grateful to Becky Hsu’s 
“happiness” team for offering valuable feedback and sharing their 
research findings with me at the Georgetown Workshop. 
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Consider another anecdote. In Su Qing’s 蘇青 (1996) 
autobiographical novel Ten Years of Marriage 結婚十年 published in 
the 1940s, a baby girl’s full month celebration party gives the female 
narrator’s affluent marital family an occasion for conspicuous 
displays. Her widowed mother, who resides in another town, 
obligingly sends in lavish gifts. Among them are a set of vermillion 
plates holding four objects representing, by dint of homonymic, 
morphological, or metaphorical associations, longevity 長, fate 命, 
wealth 富, and status 貴: noodles 長壽麵, sweets 洋糖, wheat gluten 
烤麩, and longan 桂圓. The narrator informs us that these objects are 
conventionally decorated with velvet flowers and images of fu 福, lu 
祿, shou 壽, or gods of happiness (from having a large family), 
prosperity (from high official ranks and ample remuneration), and 
longevity. But with a girl as the recipient, the grandmother has 
dispensed with fu and lu, leaving only two images of shou: “I thought: 
probably mother had figured that since Cucu was a girl, happiness 
and prosperity were beside the point, so she redoubled her prayers 
for good health and a long life. It was an inglorious thing for her to 
have given birth to a daughter; now the daughter was extending that 
odium by giving birth to a granddaughter. I couldn’t help take pity 
on mother and her life of unremitting misery” (Su 1996, 52-53).
I bring up these two anecdotes to illustrate two points. One, in 
traditional China, the idea of happiness hinged primarily on siring 
male heirs (fu) and secondarily on prosperity (lu) and good health 
(shou). Happy affairs 喜事 were typically associated with the birth of 
a (male) child, examination success, promotion, the milestones of 
old age, and a good death. Second, because lu was foreclosed to all 
women, happiness was deeply cleaved by a gender gap. Upwardly 
mobile men were able to avail themselves of both the public and 
private sources of happiness. Whether pursuing the more prestigious 
civil service career route or engaging in trade and commerce, men 
had access to economic independence and social recognition and 
enjoyed the pleasures of friendship, travel, and leisure. The successful 
among them were likely to have come from large prosperous families 
and able, in their turns, to rear a good number of children while 
being shielded from the exigencies of life besetting the indigent. The 
bohemian among them were also fond of consorting with artistically 
accomplished courtesans in the pleasure quarters with whom they 
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were able to forge a kind of emotional bond not possible in the 
domestic context when marriages were rarely contracted to fulfill a 
romantic courtship (Lee 2014, 117-57).  
For women, the situation was much starker. As the grandmother 
in the second anecdote knew well, the ingredients of happiness for 
women boiled down to longevity, if only so that they could in their 
old age reap the reward for a lifetime’s toil and pain, from footbinding 
and childbirth to the daily drudgery of domestic work. The only way 
they could partake of the blessings of the gods of fu and lu was by 
proxy through their menfolk. Needless to say, their happiness was 
entirely confined to the private sphere. Except for a small number of 
elite women who commanded a circle of devotees to their poetry or 
painting (or more rarely martial valor), or renowned courtesans with 
a steady, appreciative clientele, women could not count public 
recognition or financial independence as their blessings. Few still 
could taste the pleasures of travel or the dynamics of voluntary 
associational life. Indeed, to see and to be seen by strangers—what 
Hannah Arendt deems the essence of human flourishing—
irrevocably marred a woman’s reputation and moral worth. In sum, 
whereas men enjoyed a degree of self-determination when it came to 
happiness, women were to surrender to the dictates of “fate” far 
more thoroughly.
The gender gap in the conception of happiness intersected the 
gap between elites and commoners. For the latter, fu was more a 
blessing than a pursuit and is more aptly translated as “good fortune” 
or, as Richard Madsen suggests, “blessed happiness.” While 
individuals might strive and pray for fu, its bestowal was left to 
impersonal, external factors—fate, luck, deities, cosmic alignments, 
mandarinal goodwill, and so on. Its opposite was huo 禍, misfortune, 
or calamity. In the Chinese correlative thinking, fu and huo were 
believed to be mutually constitutive and one never strayed too far 
from the other: “Good fortune,” pronounces the Daoist classic 
Daodejing 道德經, “is the lair of ill fortune.” This logic is perhaps best 
illustrated by the parable of Saiweng 塞翁, a wise old man of the 
northern frontier. When his horse ran away, he declined his 
neighbors’ commiseration. When the wayward horse reappeared 
with a companion, he demurred at the neighbors’ congratulations. 
When his son broke a leg riding the new horse, he waved away their 
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condolences and subsequently felt fortunate when his son was 
exempted from the draft during a barbarian invasion. Saiweng’s 
serenely philosophic attitude towards the braiding of fortune and 
misfortune took the individual will and agency out of the picture in 
the contemplation of the workings of fate. No doubt Saiweng was 
assailed alternately by sorrow and joy with each successive incident, 
but happiness, it seems, did not hinge on his feelings but rather on 
his ability to reconcile himself with shi 勢, or the “propensity of 
things”; in so doing, he takes leave of happiness per se and simply 
goes with the flow (Jullien 1995; 2007).
A familiar sight during the Chinese New Year Festival is the 
upside down calligraphic rendition of fu pasted on doors, windows, 
and walls, punning on the homonymous dao 倒, upside down, and 
dao 到, to arrive. It is surely the most visually succinct way of 
capturing the folk conception of happiness. Significantly, when fu 
came—courtesy of ancestors or gods—it brought blessings to the 
household or kin group as a corporate entity; there was no room for 
a separate peace. Career success, for example, became truly meaningful 
only when one could “return to the hometown attired in brocades” 
衣錦還鄉 and thereby bring glory to one’s ancestors and lineage 
group 光宗耀祖. Siring male heirs, likewise, was the foremost filial 
duty a son owed to parents and the patriline. This quasi-religious 
popular cult of happiness, however, was viewed with a mixture of 
condescension and disdain by the elites, especially those drawn to 
Buddhism and Daoism and those with bohemian inclinations. For 
them, fu-lu-shou were crude, philistine desires that stood in the way 
of the cultivation of inner virtue, de 德, and the striving for more 
transcendent goals, such as enlightenment, immortality, serving the 
Way or Dao 道, and bestowing benevolence on the multitudes under 
Heaven 天下. Confucianism might be known for its avowedly 
worldly orientation, but a true Confucian gentleman did not set 
personal happiness as the touchstone of all values. Instead, he lived 
by the motto, “To worry ahead of the whole world and to rejoice 
only after the whole world is happy” 先天下之憂而憂，後天下之樂
而樂.
The high-minded literati might seek le 樂 (joy) and qu 趣 
(pleasure, pastime) in such elegant activities as composing poetry 
and essay, painting, practicing calligraphy, playing a musical 
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instrument, playing chess, banqueting, clubbing, and sightseeing. 
The more solitary among these activities were believed to purify the 
heart-mind, instill tranquility, and align oneself closer to the Way of 
Heaven than did the crass pursuit of worldly goods. When necessary 
the true gentlemen willingly forewent the desiderata of fu-lu-shou in 
order to pursue these more spiritual and individualistic lequ. In 
troubled times, especially, they might well retreat from civic or even 
family life in order to preserve their inner peace and moral integrity. 
Eremitism was thus a quietist expression of the elites’ reluctance to 
bow to the sway of fate and luck and desire for agency in grasping 
their destiny. 
In traditional Chinese literature, the convention of wrapping 
up a tale, long or short, simple or convoluted, with a “grand reunion” 
(大團圓 or 破鏡重圓, a broken mirror restored, in the case of a 
conjugal couple) of family members separated by turmoil, intrigue, 
or accident predominated until the mid-18th century, when the high 
Qing masterpiece Dream of the Red Chamber 紅樓夢 resolutely 
broke with it. The obligatory happy ending betrayed an abiding faith 
in the justness of the cosmic order and was very much of a piece with 
the literary convention of rewarding industry and virtue with the 
blessings of fu in the form of numerous descendants and generations 
of successful examination candidates-turned-officials. Significantly, 
the central motif of the entire repertoire of premodern literature 
(including both fiction and drama) was not romantic love as in the 
case of modern literature, but filial piety. To the extent to which 
tales of filial heroism were spun or embellished by the educated for 
popular consumption, the elite and the plebeian worldviews 
converged. With the exception of the countercultural type, the elite 
did not pit their visions of the good life radically against the folk 
conception of happiness centered on family solidarity, prosperity, 
and continuity. Instead, there was a good deal of overlap and traffic 
between the two social strata in that both subscribed to an objective 
set of criteria for evaluating the good life. Those who sought a more 
subjectively meaningful existence found themselves at odds with 
both the elite and the plebeian visions.
Shen Fu’s 沈復 memoir Six Records of a Floating Life2 浮生六記 
2 Page references are from the Penguin edition (Shen 1983). I have also 
consulted the Chinese edition compiled by Cai Genxiang (Shen Fu 沈
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can help us flesh out the tension between a dominant, objective 
understanding of happiness and a countercultural, subjective 
understanding. Composed at the turn of the 19th century, Six Records 
(of which only four are extant) is a lyrical account of the author’s 
loving marriage, his network of friends, his beloved leisure pursuits, 
his travels, and his liaisons with courtesans. A well-educated scholar 
who failed repeatedly at the civil service examinations, Shen Fu tried 
to eke out a living working in government yamen 衙門 as a private 
secretary. It was an unstable occupation with a meager pay and little 
prestige. Shen frequently found himself unemployed and had to rely 
on family and friends to tide him over. He also tried petty commerce 
but did not have much talent or enthusiasm for it. He did manage, 
intermittently, to earn small sums from painting and seal carving, 
though not as much as his wife Chen Yun 陳蕓 was able to with her 
needlework. While they never quite starved, life was precarious and 
his wife died young from a protracted illness that they could ill afford 
to treat properly.
The memoir has been a perennial favorite of generations of 
readers drawn to its tender depictions of conjugal bliss, convivial 
gatherings of friends, and the small pleasures of everyday life. For all 
the hardships and miseries that he frankly laid bare, Shen Fu looked 
back on his life with gratitude and contentment and apparently 
wanted us to think that he had a good life. Particularly memorable 
were passages recording the playful and ingenious ways in which he 
and his wife made the most of their simple life: cultivating bonsai, 
entertaining friends, going to temple fairs together with her in male 
disguise, and so on. Children were mentioned as an afterthought and 
poverty never stood in the way of their zestful enjoyment of a way of 
life that was aloof from the goals of vernacular happiness. 
Shen Fu was writing in the wake of the intellectual and literary 
effervescence of the late Ming (16th and 17th centuries) known as the 
“cult of qing 情 (sentiment)” (Lee 2007). Given impetus by Wang 
Yangming’s 王陽明 philosophy of innate moral knowledge, liangzhi 
良知, the movement sought to inject an element of the personal and 
the subjective into the Confucian ritual order by extolling the 
supreme power of sentiment and love. Despite the resurgence of 
復 2008).
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Confucian orthodoxy after the Manchu conquest, the movement 
reached its apogee in the 18th-century classic Dream of the Red 
Chamber. In his low-keyed manner, Shen Fu was living out the legacy 
of this sentimental turn, to the extent that he was able to marry the 
woman he was actually in love with, thus winning institutional 
concession, if not endorsement, of a subjective existence dedicated to 
emotional intimacy and aesthetic and sensual pleasures. That he 
should have begun his memoir with “the joys of the wedding 
chamber” bespeaks the importance he attached to the life of the 
heart in defiance of orthodox opprobrium of conjugal intimacy as 
unfilial égoïsme à deux. His deep and enduring devotion to his wife 
put considerable distance between the young couple and the 
extended family. Acting contrary to the codes of filial piety, he stood 
by his wife when his father ordered her expulsion; years later, he 
failed to arrive home in time to bid farewell to his dying father. He 
tells us that when he finally reached home, he beat his head on the 
ground until it bled in grief and remorse: “Alas! My father had a hard 
life, always working away from home, and giving birth to an unfilial 
son like me who seldom gave him happiness and who failed to care 
for him on his deathbed. How can I avoid punishment for my unfilial 
crimes?” (92).
The remorse stemming from the recognition that their pursuit 
of happiness had brought pain to their family was also shared by his 
wife. On her deathbed, she gave the following summation of her life:
I have been happy as your wife these twenty-three 
years. You have loved me and sympathized with me 
in everything, and never rejected me despite my 
faults. Having had for my husband an intimate 
friend like you, I have no regrets over this life. I have 
had warm cotton clothes, enough to eat, and a 
pleasant home. I have strolled among streams and 
rocks, at places like the Pavilion of the Waves and 
the Villa of Serenity. In the midst of life, I have been 
just like an immortal. But a true Immortal must go 
through many incarnations before reaching 
enlightenment. Who could I dare hope to become 
an Immortal in only one lifetime? In our eagerness 
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for immortality, we have only incurred the wrath of 
the Creator, and brought on our troubles with our 
passion. Because you have loved me too much, I have 
had a short life! (87-88)
 
Although the conventional indices of fu/happiness had largely 
eluded her—rank and riches, a large family with many offspring, and 
good health—she deemed her life a happy one by more subjective 
criteria: a loving and companionate husband, several opportunities 
to travel and see “the world,” and a home that afforded her a measure 
of autonomy and a space for her creativity. All this she deemed 
worthy of the price of a foreshortened life. And yet, this intensely 
subjective, bohemian definition of happiness seemed beclouded by 
anxiety and foreboding—about the hubris to dare be like gods in 
their carefree perfection and immortality. If society at large saw 
happiness as something that came to one as fate saw fit, then the 
couple’s pursuit of happiness may indeed have violated some cosmic 
law for which they must pay a price—she with her life and he with 
bereavement at middle-age. In her last will and testament, she told 
Shen Fu to make amends with his family and find a good woman to 
look after their two children. In so doing he might atone for their 
offense by reintegrating himself into the ritual order of the family as 
a filial son and dutiful father, thereby putting behind his bohemian 
experiment as a uxorious husband and a lumpen-literatus. 
Six Chapters appeals to the modern sensibility with its 
uncommon affirmation of the personal and the subjective and is 
readily appropriated by modern romantics for whom happiness is 
inconceivable in any other terms. It is easy to lose sight of the fact 
that the dominant understanding of happiness before the 20th 
century made scant reference to either love or freedom. As Prasenjit 
Duara (2014) has shown, traditional China was a horizontally 
stratified society with the elite and plebeian classes inhabiting 
separate albeit overlapping moral and spiritual worlds. For the 
Confucian gentleman, the cultivation of virtue required an ascetic 
lifestyle and dedication to the defense of the Way against the abuse 
of temporal powers, even when it entailed terrible costs: loss of rank, 
property, and life (and sometimes also the liquidation of one’s entire 
clan). Still, “there is no thought of paradise or hell. Virtue is its own 
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reward and the inner satisfaction of being in accord with Heaven’s 
will” (130). In folk culture, by contrast, ideas and images of paradise 
and hell abounded and were a critical component in the cult of 
happiness. Duara points out that while the elites did not themselves 
subscribe to such beliefs, at least not overtly, they were generally 
tolerant of the commoners’ yearnings for human flourishing and 
indeed were apt to take it upon themselves to facilitate such a desire, 
enacting a Confucian activist ideal known as zaofu yu min 造福於民. 
An early articulation can be found in the History of Han 漢書: “May 
the king bestow xing upon all under Heaven.” An exegete explains: 
“All matters of human flourishing are called xing/happiness” 福喜之
事，皆稱為幸 (Cihai 1999, 1908).
The best elaboration of this ideal comes from a retired official 
named Huang Liuhong 黃六鴻 who published an instructional and 
reference manual on local administration that drew on his double 
stint as a district magistrate in the early Qing (1670s). Giving it the 
title of A Complete Book Concerning Happiness and Benevolence 福惠
全書 (1984), Huang explains the appearance of “happiness” and 
“benevolence” in a book dealing with matters of government and 
administration: 
“Happiness” is mentioned here in connection with 
the magistrate’s intention of bringing happiness to 
the people, while “benevolence” refers to the actions 
he takes to bestow benevolence upon them. … The 
ancient sage Mencius said, “All men have a mind 
which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others. 
The ancient kings had this commiserating mind, and 
likewise, as a matter of course, they had a 
commiserating government.” This is, in essence, 
what this book is all about. (53)
Given the propensity in classical Chinese prose for parallelisms, the 
alignment of happiness with intent 心 and benevolence with action 
事 in the English translation seem overly rigid. The Mencius 
quotation makes it clear that intent and action were both required to 
bring happiness and benevolence to the people. Of interest to us is 
the assumption that happiness was a governmental affair and 
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dependent on the moral charisma, goodwill, and knowhow of 
mandarins. Huang Liuhong (1974) took it for granted that it was in 
the power of the monarch and his deputies to make happiness a 
reality for their subject people-children 子民. In fact, they could not 
help but strive to “make happiness” 造福 and “bestow benevolence” 
施惠 because they could not bear 不忍 the unhappiness of the 
common people (3). 
Thus in the orthodox formulation, fu was a largess that the 
ruling class, on the basis of their superior access to Heaven’s will 天
命 through learning and cultivation, helped deliver to those who, by 
dint of their ignorance, could only pray for good fortune and were 
indebted to both Heaven and their father-and-mother officials 父母
官 when happiness did come their way. In this manner the imperial 
bureaucracy arrogated almost godly powers to itself, yet it still upheld 
the fundamental belief in fu as pertaining to the cosmic, amenable to 
human intervention but ultimately unknowable to mere mortals. 
For this reason, imperial Confucianism largely tolerated the spread 
of Buddhism and Daoism, permitting their practitioners the niche 
of ministering to the popular desire for fu-lu-shou through temple 
worship, divination, and ritual service, so long as they did not foment 
sectarian cults or millenarian movements that challenged the ruling 
class’s monopoly of access to the Way and interpretation of Heaven’s 
will. Commoners might pray to a panoply of gods, spirits, and 
ancestors, beseeching them for fertility 多子多孫, clement weather 
風調雨順, good harvest 五穀豐登, safe journey 出入平安, long life 長
命百歲, wealth 招財進寶, social mobility 飛黃騰達 and so on, but 
must steer clear of worshipping Heaven itself (Duara 2014, 164). In 
other words, the cult of happiness must remain a vernacular, 
depoliticized affair, and unhappiness and discontent must not 
become the rallying point for insurrectional politics, though not all 
rulers were able to prevent the latter from materializing.
Rebels and Revolutionaries (and the West)
All this would change in the 20th century. Radical May Fourth 
intellectuals pushed the internal gender and class fissures of the 
Confucian conception of the good life and good society to the 
foreground in their agitations for a total social revolution. Liberty 自
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由 was consecrated as the fount of all goals and values. The path to 
liberation began invariably with the repudiation of the institution of 
arranged marriage as the epitome of unfreedom. As is well known, 
the ideological arsenal of the May Fourth rebels was stocked with 
ideas borrowed from the European Enlightenment, mostly via Japan. 
In Europe prior to the age of Enlightenment, according to 
Darrin McMahon (2006), happiness was also regarded as a matter of 
good fortune. The Greek word eudaimonia literally yokes the good 
(eu) to what the gods (daimon) bring. In English, “happiness” derives 
from the Middle English and Old Norse word happ (chance, fortune) 
and refers to what befalls us by happenstance. Indeed, in most Indo-
European languages, the elements of luck and fate are preserved in 
their respective terms for happiness, most notably bonheur in French, 
felicitá in Spanish, and Glück in German (11). It is a creed shared 
across the premodern world that only those who have the good gods 
on their side and meet their ends peacefully can be deemed fortunate, 
blessed, and happy. In other words, no one is truly happy until he or 
she is dead: “It is the end—death—that [ensures] in its finality that 
one’s good fortune, one’s blessedness, can no longer be taken away” 
(6). Instead of a psychological or emotional state, “happiness, rather, 
is a characterization of an entire life that can be reckoned only at 
death” (7). As Shen Fu’s wife intuited, it marks human perfection, 
the state of approaching divine transcendence, and a precious reward 
for the humble and the virtuous. McMahon demonstrates that the 
modern understanding of happiness as a right, an entitlement, even 
a moral obligation is a legacy of the Enlightenment. It is only since 
the 17th and 18th centuries that humanity has come to believe that 
happiness is its due and that every man, woman, and child can, and 
should, be happy. Chance and fortune are increasingly shunted to 
the obscure corner of freak accidents, and pain and suffering are the 
targets of humanitarian crusades. 
Once the Enlightenment understanding of happiness as an 
individual right and as a subjective experience was introduced to 
China along with European literature, philosophy, social thought, 
and political institutions, two problems cried out for redress: First, 
the folk definition of happiness as fu was premised on a gender gap 
that denied women access to economic independence and moral 
autonomy. It pitted men’s happiness against that of women and, to a 
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lesser extent, the older generation’s happiness against that of the 
younger generation. Women and youth, in the lingo of the era, had 
no renge, a composite of rights, dignity, and autonomy. The social 
imaginary of happiness rarely took their point of view, and when it 
did it merely lamented their mean fate or hard luck. Secondly, the 
Confucian ideal of zaofu yu min and patronage of the cult of fu-lu-
shou masked an iniquitous social order in which the elites had the 
wherewithal to pursue both lofty goals and aesthetic pleasures while 
the commoners had to resort to projecting their hope for a good life 
onto gods and spirits and the next life. 
The most unflinching indictment of the Confucian social order 
issued from Lu Xun’s 魯迅 “Diary of a Madman,” 狂人日記 the 
founding text of modern Chinese literature. Its hallucinating 
protagonist discovers to his horror that the pages of the venerated 
classics are filled with the word chiren 吃人 (eat people) in between 
sanctimonious lines about benevolence and virtue. In “The New 
Year’s Sacrifice” 祝福 (Zhufu, literally, prayers for blessings), a twice-
widowed woman is cast out of her home by marital relatives who 
covet her late husband’s paltry estate, and then out of her employer’s 
house on account of her accursed fate. Shortly before her death on 
the eve of the Chinese New Year as a destitute beggar, she tries to 
seek solace in the possibility of meeting loved ones in the underworld 
(Lee 2014, ch.1). The story ends on a pseudo-joyful note registering 
the jubilant atmosphere of a small town basking in the gods’ blessings. 
The message cannot be clearer: the townsfolk erect their happiness 
directly on the dead body of a wretched woman. This message was 
echoed and reinforced in countless May Fourth stories aiming at 
exposing the injustice, duplicity, and hypocrisy of a social order that 
preyed on the weak and helpless in the name of benevolence and 
harmony. 
A story that arguably rivals “The New Year’s Sacrifice” in 
bleakness is Rou Shi’s 柔石 “A Slave Mother” 為奴隸的母親 (Lau, 
Hsia, and Lee 1981), in which an impoverished and desperate 
husband pawns out his wife to a wealthy gentry family on a three-
year contract as a concubine. The temporary husband/employer is an 
elderly gentleman who yearns for a son but whose barren wife is 
unwilling to put up with secondary wives. Leaving her own infant 
son behind, the “slave mother” in due course gives birth to a baby boy 
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on whom she pours all her pent-up maternal affections, only to be 
torn away again when the contract period is up. When she reaches 
home physically exhausted and emotionally depleted, the husband 
greets her with two bloodless words: “Make dinner” (219). Once 
again, the quest for fu on the part of the gentry family comes at the 
direct expense of the downtrodden, cannibalizing an underclass 
woman’s womb, milk, and maternal love. Happiness seems sheer 
extravagance for this penurious couple and for countless others like 
them with little hope of rising above subsistence living and women’s 
subjection, a condition likened to “the long night, silent and cold as 
death, [that] seemed to drag on endlessly” (219).
It was this long, funereal night that the revolution of the 20th 
century aimed to upend. The revolution was to take place on two 
fronts. On the one hand was the liberation of women from  the 
patriarchal institutions of arranged marriage and virilocal residence. 
In their place was the new ideal of the conjugal family founded on 
free love, companionship, and women’s right to work and right to 
divorce. On the other hand was the liberation of the laboring masses 
from the yoke of class oppression and ideological subjugation enabled 
by religious illusions or “superstitions.” The Chinese Enlightenment, 
as the May Fourth/New Culture movement is often characterized, 
was first and foremost an iconoclastic assault on the “old family 
system” 舊家庭 and “feudal superstitions” 封建迷信. The heroine of 
this twin revolution was the New Woman 新女性 who, having 
received an enlightened education, dared to enter into romantic 
relationships in the absence of parental supervision or in the teeth of 
parental objection. Should the courtship or marriage prove unviable, 
she was at liberty to seek annulment or divorce. The ideal abode of 
the conjugal family was in urban centers where the couple could earn 
their livelihood in the new commercial economy. 
With the familial umbilical cord cut off, it was often necessary 
for the wife also to seek gainful employment. In the process emerged 
many a woman writer, educator, actor, artist, nurse, athlete, secretary, 
and shop clerk, who proudly distanced themselves from the maid, 
midwife, herbalist, and prostitute. An autonomous renge grounded 
in economic independence gradually became a hypergood for 
women, even when it led to insecurity, deracination, and loneliness. 
In their bittersweet choice, we hear echoes of Shen Fu and his wife’s 
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courageous flight from the pervading cult of happiness, ardent 
adventure in the countercultural cult of qing, and soulful gesture to 
repair the emotional collateral damage. Unlike Shen Fu, few May 
Fourth rebels were willing to return to the embrace of the patriarchal 
family, though some did try to make symbolic compromises with the 
kinship ritual order. In Lu Xun’s story “In the Wineshop”在酒樓上, 
for example, a young man, who in his radical youth dared to yank off 
the beards of the tutelary gods in the local temple, yields to his 
mother’s wish to rescue his little brother’s grave from an encroaching 
river. Taking a replacement coffin to the burial ground with four 
workmen, he feels oddly elated about the prospect of “seeing” his 
long departed brother: “this was a new sensation for me” (1977, 
148). After much digging, however, they come up empty-handed, 
the grave apparently having already been washed away. Nonetheless, 
he goes through the motion of reburial by depositing a handful of 
dirt from the original gravesite in the new coffin. For this gesture of 
honoring the kinship ritual order, he reproaches himself for betraying 
his youthful ideals and yet is glad to have brought some consolations, 
even happiness, to the less fortunate and less enlightened such as his 
illiterate mother. 
The May Fourth inaugurated a melancholy genre of romantic 
fiction in which the heroes and heroines ruminated on the promise 
of happiness in free love and companionate marriage and the wide 
arena of free sociability and professional development. They rarely 
spoke of fu, xi, le, qu and preferred instead xingfu 幸福, coined by 
Meiji-era Japanese translators of European texts to render the 
distinctly Enlightenment notion of “happiness.” Xingfu was part and 
parcel of the modern vocabulary that, along with minzhu 民主, kexue 
科學, shehui 社會, geren 個人, and renge 人格, heralded a whole new 
way of being Chinese. With the overthrown of Confucian cosmology, 
life’s meaning and purpose was dislodged from such external sources 
as Heaven and patrilineal continuity, and internalized as pertaining 
to a psychologized “human nature” or the “heart.” Xingfu was now 
eminently an affair of the heart, a subjective state knowable only to 
the individual, which the ancient Greeks called hedone. The transition 
from the quasi-religious cult of fu/eudaimonia to the secular pursuit 
of xingfu/hedone underlined the growing importance of subjective 
feeling and the exaltation of romantic passion in early 20th-century 
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urban culture. The new salience of emotion thus indexed the rise of 
the individual. The contemplative fiction of Lu Xun and his 
contemporaries chronicled this inward journey in which the 
individual confronted his or her heart with little more than a few 
foreign novels and treatises as guides.
The transition was much less obvious in the rural areas, where 
fu and xi remained the keywords of the cult of happiness well into 
the reform era. When anthropologist Sulamith Potter undertook 
field research in a Chinese village in the early 1980s, she walked into 
a world where happiness apparently had little to do with feeling or 
mood and everything to do with proper conduct and hard striving 
for prosperity. The cultural shock forced her to turn her gaze back on 
her own society and cultural habitus. Her reflections on the centrality 
of emotion in the West and the extent to which the social order is 
validated at the level of individual feeling can help us appreciate the 
dramatic transformation in early 20th–century urban China. In some 
ways, the May Fourth and post-May Fourth urban generations were 
already coping with some of the angst and predicament that would 
manifest with greater urgency in late 20th-century Western societies. 
Their experience of alienation from the rural world from which 
many of them hailed also mirrored the cultural gap that Potter 
observed in her fieldwork.
As Potter explains, emotion in modern Western societies is the 
legitimizing basis of all social relationships, including not only 
contractual ones such as marriage but also ascriptive parent-child 
relations. It is an article of modern faith that marriage should be 
grounded in love as its culmination and institutional sanctification, 
and that it should be dissolved once love is no longer, otherwise it 
amounts to legalized prostitution. Between parents and children, 
too, love takes precedence over duty and obligation, so that 
generational estrangement or abuse-induced enmity is often enough 
to undermine the claims of blood ties. Moreover, within the domestic 
sphere, intimate gestures of affection are considered essential in 
sustaining and legitimizing familial relationships. Kisses, hugs, cards, 
gifts, and constant protestations of love create the illusion that it is 
affect, not blood or contract, that holds the family unit together and 
fortifies it into an emotional refuge from the cruel, cold world 
beyond. These gestures also serve to democratize entrenched 
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hierarchical relations by closing age, generation, and gender gaps, 
thereby transforming the family from a social and economic 
institution to a sentimental community. Lastly, the centrality of 
emotion extends even to the workplace, the canonical space of social 
contract and disinterestedness. Potter cites Arlie Hochschild’s classic 
work, The Managed Heart, about the aviation industry’s effort to 
train its employees to work the subtle arts of affect in order to provide 
an experience of sincere, personalized service to passengers (at least 
in the pre-deregulation era). 
By contrast, Chinese village life in its most traditional state was 
a ritualistic order in which emotion was not granted any formal 
social role and therefore had no formal social consequences. In other 
words, emotional experiences, however intense or devastating, could 
not create, maintain, injure, or destroy social relationships (Potter 
1988, 185-86). Emotional outbursts might be unpleasant or 
unwelcome, but they were rarely consequential, nor were they 
accorded truth status. For this reason emotion was often allowed a 
wide latitude. Childhood tantrums, for example, were routinely 
ignored instead of raising alarm or being met with solicitous efforts 
at mollification (187-88). Adults too were permitted to vent their 
anger or grief openly until the fit of passion ran its course. Instead, 
“attention [was] directed away from the psychological processes of 
individuals, especially their feelings, and toward the appropriate 
expression of shared intersubjective agreement about moral values 
and the social world” (190-91). The exception that proves the rule 
was the amorous feeling of love. Because of its implications for 
marriage and family, love was permissible only when it was expressed 
in a ritualistic, non-individual-directed manner. A young man 
wishing to woo a young woman would do well to put in a day’s hard 
work hoeing her family plot, fetching water for their kitchen tank, 
and then some.3 Happiness, it follows, was not indexed to the 
3  There are intriguing parallels between such rustic practices and 19th-
century English courtship rituals as portrayed with consummate flair in 
Jane Austen’s novels of manners (see Illouz 2012, ch. 2; MacIntyre 1984, 
chs. 14, 16). In both, a man’s erotic interest in a woman is conveyed in 
codified conduct under the watchful eye of an entire community which 
takes it upon itself to judge his suitability on the basis of his social station, 
character (embodied enactment of communal moral standards), as well as 
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individual or the heart, but to the corporate kinship group whose 
solidarity was sanctified in the cult of fu-lu-shou.
What this meant was that the social order, at least in the context 
of village life relatively untouched by modern print culture, was not 
predicated on individual consent or perceived to be an amalgamation 
of individual will, as the theory of social contract might have it. Each 
person was under no obligation to align his or her internal feeling 
state with external exigencies. Citing Richard Solomon, Potter 
contextualizes the non-alignment of social action and inner feeling 
underlying “the Chinese definition of sincerity [which did] not exist 
in reference to inner feeling, but require[d] only the enactment of 
civility” (194). Small wonder that, in response to her frequent 
inquiries about feelings, an informant interjected with a note of 
vexation, “How I feel doesn’t matter.” 
That the traditional social order did not take account of 
individual feelings was precisely what was unacceptable to the May 
Fourth generation. For them, how the widow in “The New Year’s 
Sacrifice” and the nameless wife in “A Slave Mother” felt mattered 
decisively if not absolutely when it came to judging the legitimacy of 
a social order. This requirement also lies at the heart of the social 
contract theory that undergirds liberal democracy. Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau proposed the social contract to reconcile concentrated 
power to the ideal of individual sovereignty and authenticity. For 
him, a social order is legitimate insofar as it is premised on the 
affirmation and validation from each member of the governed. In a 
large polity in which direct democracy is not possible, citizens express 
their consent to the political arrangement in which the majority 
are governed by a minority by formally selecting representatives 
who vow to represent their interests and preferences. In so doing 
they symbolically close the gap between subjective selves and the 
objective social order. When they pull the levers in the voting booth, 
it is as if each of them were teleporting a little piece of their hearts to 
earning powers. Marriage is thus not about matching two unique 
personalities on the basis of emotional “chemistry,” but a part of continual 
strategic negotiations of wealth, honor, and status among more or less 
socially compatible kin groups. The economy of recognition and 
autonomy and its attendant agony that characterize modern romantic 
relationships are largely absent here.
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the political center to be melded into the General Will. The centrality 
of emotion in Western culture is thus intimately bound up with the 
primacy of the individual in the liberal political tradition, in contrast 
to the marginalization of the individual and his or her emotion in 
the Chinese tradition, as Potter has documented. 
How Happiness Became an Emotion
To the extent to which modernity was a heroic project to 
release the individual from an impersonal social order, it has always 
sanctified sentimental emancipation as a revolutionary project. 
Beginning with Rousseau for whom sincerity and truth were 
synonymous, radical politics in the liberal West invariably took 
individual conscience as its touchstone and the heart as its compass: 
“There is a pervasive stress on what each and every individual feels 
and experiences as providing the ultimate standards of legitimacy, 
action, and definition of collective goals” (Seligman et al. 2008, 133). 
It should come as no surprise that the “pursuit of happiness,” 
enshrined in the founding manifesto of the United States of America 
as a God-given right, should have also been conceived largely within 
the parameters of individual emotion and subjective well-being, as 
hedone that can be measured on a hedonometer, so to speak. However 
difficult it is to conclusively answer the question “Am I happy?”—no 
less so than “Am I saved?” or “Am I in love?”—Americans have 
tirelessly sought out metrics and tests to gauge their affective states 
and are forever hungry for newfangled recipes of happiness. It seems 
un-American not to engage in what a British observer characterizes 
as “the exhausting daily application of the Declaration of 
Independence” (Whippman 2012). Periodically happiness gurus 
remind everyone that happiness is an interactive, communal, even 
spiritual enterprise: “Happiness comes from between: between 
yourself and others, between yourself and your work, and between 
yourself and something larger than yourself” (Haidt 2006). But in 
the final analysis, such advice still takes the individual “you” as the 
fundamental unit of accounting when evaluating the legitimacy and 
efficacy of institutions and practices.
The authors of the sociological classic Habits of the Heart long 
ago descried this deep-seated proclivity to take the individual as the 
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measure of all things and “to think of commitments—from marriage 
and work to political and religious involvement—as enhancements 
of the sense of individual well-being rather than as moral imperatives” 
(Bellah et al. 1986, 47). In sum, the American discourse of happiness 
rarely strays far from debating the relative merits of what the same 
authors call “utilitarian individualism” versus “expressive 
individualism,” or of work and family, money and meaning, head 
and heart. Out of this seesaw has emerged a distinctive American 
breed of individualists: the bobos who strive to have both in equal 
measure (bourgeois bohemians) (Brooks 2000). 
For Charles Taylor (1989), the rise of the individual goes hand 
in hand with the bourgeois affirmation of ordinary life, whereby 
previously venerated higher pursuits such as religious contemplation 
and military exploits are held in suspicion, and previously disparaged 
activities revolving around domestic and occupational life are 
sanctified as intrinsically worthy and ennobling. As the individual 
becomes disembedded from the larger social structures and the 
overarching values and goals institutionalized therein, personal 
happiness is enshrined as the constitutive good, as the telos of secular 
life and governmentality. The road to what Deirdre McCloskey 
(2012) dubs “happyism” is a short one. Happyism elevates 
hedonomics to a science to be deployed by psychologists and 
behavioral economists who are all too eager to peer into our interior 
hedonometers to count the frequency of dopamine surges. Much of 
this new science is based on self-reporting and laboratory experiments 
with isolated individuals urged to look within, hence reinforcing the 
habits of heart cemented in what Christopher Lasch (1978) has 
branded as the “culture of narcissism.” 
Having experienced a social world in which personal feeling 
holds little importance, Potter (1988) is critical of the great 
expenditure of resources for the sake of continuous and pervasive 
attention to individual psychological processes and affective states in 
her own society (183-84). Eva Illouz (2007) too speaks of “an 
emotional ontology” that is the hypostatizing effect of the compulsive 
inward gaze and endless verbalization in television talk shows and 
autobiographical narratives, as if the emotions are both trapped in 
the “deep self of their bearer” (33) and detachable from the self for 
public clarification and management (36). In place of a politically 
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active civil society is a therapeutic culture that gives us “micro public 
spheres, that is, domains of action submitted to a public gaze, 
regulated by procedures of speech, and by values of equality and 
fairness” (Illouz 2007, 37). Jackson Lears (2013) invokes Philip 
Rieff’s formulation “the triumph of the therapeutic” to capture the 
worldview embedded in the happiness industry whereby “all 
overarching structures of meaning have collapsed, and there is 
nothing at stake beyond a manipulatable sense of well-being.” 
Nonetheless, the therapeutic culture taps into the modern 
democratic sensibility that valorizes individual autonomy and agency 
as well as universal parity, hence proving irresistible to emancipatory 
causes, most notably feminism.
Because the social order is experienced as having no inherent 
basis for continuity, it must be continuously reinvented and 
reaffirmed from within multitudes of individuals. As Potter (1988) 
points out, “If emotions must be expressed sincerely, and the lack of 
sincere feeling invalidates relationship, then the individual is 
required to produce a continuous stream of emotional expression 
that is simultaneously sincere and appropriate; if this does not occur, 
the social order is endangered” (183). The happiness imperative 
works especially to the advantage of capital by imposing an on-going 
regime of self-monitoring and self-improvement (Davies 2015). To 
cope with this burden, Americans turn to psychoanalysis, 
psychotherapy, and self-help advice, all instruments of biopower 
that prey on their happiness anxiety. In her latest book Why Love 
Hurts, Eva Illouz (2012) argues that psychoanalysis is to love what 
neoliberalism is to society: whenever things go wrong, it is your own 
fault. In medieval Europe, love sickness was borne with dignity and 
pride as a token of one’s strength of character: “The aristocratic 
aestheticization of suffering combined with religious transfiguration 
to render it an order of experience that lent meaning and even 
greatness to the self” (129). Today, in contrast, it is a pathological 
condition that must be cured for the sake of happiness. The spread of 
positive psychology makes it practically inconceivable to include 
pain and suffering in the definition of the good life (Ehrenreich 
2009).
While Americans seem as adept at critiquing, even mocking 
their obsession with happiness as they are at pursuing it, Illouz (an 
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Israeli sociologist) is among the few who take due notice of 
happyism’s umbilical cord to democracy, that is, its roots in the 
emergence of the middle class and the sanctification of ordinary life, 
the humanitarian intolerance of suffering on the part of disadvantaged 
groups (slaves, women, ethnic minorities, animals), and the aporia of 
the liberal democratic polity in which an elite minority governs a 
heterogeneous majority notwithstanding the noble idea of popular 
sovereignty. It is not far-fetched to say that happyism and its manifold 
maladies are the price of democracy and the seeds were sown at the 
inception of the great American experiment.
Although the paradox of happiness is most acutely experienced 
in contemporary America, the challenge of grounding a social order 
in individual emotion was also keenly felt by the May Fourth and 
post-May Fourth generations who boldly broke with the patriarchal 
kinship system and insisted on injecting freedom, autonomy, and 
equality into the institutions of marriage and family. In Su Qing’s 
autobiographical novel introduced at the beginning, the narrator 
endured ten years of loveless marriage and finally found the courage 
to seek a divorce. In the sequel, she chronicles her life as a professional 
writer and magazinist during and after Shanghai’s “lonely island” 
period (1937-45) in the midst of Japanese occupation of eastern 
China. After a rocky start, she managed to launch a moderately 
successful career, acquiring a sizeable readership, enjoying the 
friendship and patronage of Shanghai’s elite circle of literati and 
politicians, and moving freely in the city and beyond insofar as it was 
possible to do so under Japanese blockade. Although she was unable 
to shake off a nagging sense of failure and loneliness as a divorcee, she 
looked upon her decade of married life with regret and horror. 
Early in the novel, she documents in excruciating detail her first 
pregnancy. Her in-laws, confidently anticipating a man-child, 
practically hoisted her on a pedestal and forced upon her a regimen 
of excessively rich foods and zero mobility. The moment her daughter 
was born, however, she was all but forgotten with only shame to keep 
her company. The experience permitted her no illusion about having 
any intrinsic worth (renge) as a person. Her sporadic efforts to start a 
career in teaching and writing were thwarted by the in-laws and the 
husband, who told her in no uncertain terms that her sole raison 
d'être was to produce the family’s heir. Her status deteriorated 
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further with each successive birth of a daughter. After the couple 
relocated to Shanghai so that the husband could continue his study 
and pursue a career in law, he took to philandering and refused to 
discharge his duty to provide for the family. Day in and day out the 
narrator had to scheme to wring a measly sum out of him for the 
daily provisions. At one point, no longer able to bear the strain of 
uncertainty and constant threat of hunger, she implored him for a 
fixed monthly allowance for household expenditures: “we can’t go 
on like this: a few dimes when you’re in a good mood and nary a 
penny when you’re in a foul mood.” He retorted: “I myself don’t 
have any fixed income. Where do you get off demanding a fixed 
allowance? You’re on your own. I don’t eat at home anyhow. … 
Frankly, if you’re gonna ask for money, you might as well put on a 
pleasant face. But you go about it as if I’ve owed you something since 
the previous life. If I were to give the money to the taxi dancers, 
they’d be kissing my feet in gratitude!” (171).
The reference to taxi dancers highlighted, in a viciously stinging 
way, the lack of renge on the part of the domestic woman. If dignity 
and autonomy could not be accommodated by marriage, then 
marriage could no longer be the institutional framework for the 
pursuit of happiness. The divorce was thus precipitated as much by 
the husband’s infidelity as by his contempt for her. It marked a 
turning point both exhilarating and frightening. Although her dozen 
or so (married) male friends and associates were solicitous and 
occasionally flirtatious with her, she was cognizant of her diminishing 
prospect of remarriage. At the same time she was far more assured of 
her self-worth than ever. The fact that she had given birth to three 
daughters receded into the background as she came to be identified 
with her writings and addressed respectfully by her readers as “Su 
Xiansheng” 蘇先生or Maestro Su. A close friend even reported to 
her a quarrel between himself and his wife at home. Allegedly, upon 
hearing him speak of the narrator’s plight as a single woman, the wife 
protested: “So you pity Miss Su. Why don’t you have some sympathy 
for your own wife too? She may have lost her husband’s love, but she 
must be very happy [xingfu], having the lot of you to comfort her. As 
for me…” (305). To be sure, happiness for the narrator admitted a 
large dose of pain (especially that of losing custody of her children), 
yet she clearly preferred to live by the modern creed that social 
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relationships and institutions must be grounded in emotional 
authenticity. A marriage without love or mutual respect was not 
worth saving for the sake of the traditional aspirations for fu-lu-shou. 
That she took to recording her triumphs and tribulations betrayed a 
desire to affirm, and to win affirmation from her readers, her fateful 
decision to seek happiness outside its conventional locus. 
In the volatile condition of occupied Shanghai, the narrator 
found herself perennially buffeted by financial insecurity until she 
gained the attention of a VIP in Wang Jingwei’s 汪精衛 puppet 
regime (likely Chen Gongbo 陳公博, mayor of Shanghai, 1940-45) 
whom she met at a party and who at a later point anonymously 
presented her with a check. It was a sum large enough to take money 
worries entirely off her mind for several years. The gift’s moral taint 
haunted her, yet in her straitened circumstances she could not afford 
to turn it away—at this point she was also providing child support as 
her ex-husband’s finances had hit bottom. Surviving as a professional 
single woman in a troubled time meant that she had to go on making 
compromising choices like this. The life course she had charted for 
herself was thus not only rife with loneliness and insecurity but was 
also a morally and politically compromised affair in her own eyes and 
a fortiori in the eyes of her detractors who considered her a literary 
harlot 文妓 selling moral integrity for bourgeois comforts and vanity. 
But she drew a line between herself and bona-fide collaborators 漢
奸:
Yes, I made a living with my writings in occupied 
Shanghai. But the “good” timing was a mere 
coincidence, not that I deliberately chose to take up 
scribbling during those “auspicious” years. It’s true 
that I didn’t chant “Down with the imperialists!” 
That’s because I was afraid of being dragged into the 
military police station to be tortured. Even if it 
wasn’t dangerous, I’m not one given to sloganeering 
anyway. I think the question is not whether I sold 
my writings, but whether my writings jeopardized 
the Republic. Consider this: rice merchants also sold 
rice and rickshaw pullers also pulled any and all 
kinds of customers [in occupied Shanghai; yet no 
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one is going after them]. So long as our country does 
not deny that those of us residing in occupied 
territories still had a right to life, however feeble and 
cowardly it was, then I admit that I did scratch out 
such a living. But I do not feel terribly guilty about 
it. (193)
In the end, Su Qing paid dearly for this streak of independence. 
After the war she was picked up by KMT police for questioning and 
her name was subject to a smear campaign. After 1949, she suffered 
even more denunciations and persecutions and eventually died an 
obscure death. She never wrote fiction and never married again. For 
the nationalists and revolutionaries, however, the snuffing out of one 
woman’s hope for happiness was negligible compared with the epic 
life and death struggle of the Chinese nation throughout the first 
half of the 20th century. In times of national crisis and national 
regeneration, those who blithely buried their heads in the shallow 
sands of domestic life, profit-seeking, and career advancement—the 
central ingredients of ordinary life sanctified in the Enlightenment—
had fallen victim to “bourgeois decadence.” This line of argument 
was espoused fervently by leftist intellectuals and later by the Chinese 
Communist Party. Ding Ling’s 丁玲 “Shanghai, Spring 1930” 1930
年春上海 gives us two such myopic characters, one male and one 
female, who are unable to see beyond tawdry private pleasures and 
career success—unlike their respective spouses who find meaning 
and purpose in underground revolutionary activism. Happiness for 
the latter is defined in collective, political terms requiring the 
curtailment or sacrifice of almost all that constitutes the satisfaction 
and fulfillment of an ordinary life—for the ultimate goal of restoring 
vernacular happiness to the “people” in the indefinite future. 
Consumers and Dreamers (and the State)
It seems that we have come full circle to the Confucian 
bifurcated conception of happiness whereby the ruling class assumed 
the obligation to facilitate the realization of the plebeian desire for 
human flourishing. The difference is that the Confucian elites 
patronized the vernacular cult of fu and to some extent also partook 
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of its basic values and aspirations. Communist orthodoxy, however, 
grew increasingly hostile toward the quotidian conception of 
happiness and its ritual and religious trappings. Vernacular happiness 
came to be regarded as suspect and illegitimate. In its place was 
enshrined the socialist ethic of service and self-sacrifice. A new kind 
of asceticism reigned supreme in the revolutionary ranks who were 
urged to serve the people 為人民服務 and create happiness for the 
people 為人民謀幸福. Any pain, deprivation, and suffering in the 
present was justified as necessary sacrifice for the collective future, 
now that happiness was once again de-individualized and its proper 
subject further projected onto the socialist fatherland. Before such a 
sublime entity, any romantic heartache, domestic discord, social 
mishap, career frustration, not to mention ennui, appeared hopelessly 
trite. Vernacular happiness was now synonymous with selfishness 
and its pursuit could amount to a political crime.4
Before the Communist rejection of bourgeois decadence and 
reintroduction of a ritual-political order was taken to the extreme 
during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the call for subordinating 
4 Jiwei Ci 慈繼偉 (1994) uses “utopianism” to characterize both the 
Communist revolution that founded the People’s Republic in 1949 and 
the three decades of socialist experiment that ensued. In his view, the 
entire radical Marxist project was in essence an unprecedented voluntarist 
pursuit of future happiness, hence its tremendous appeal to China’s 
suffering multitudes. This hedonic strand, initially submerged under 
revolutionary asceticism, reared its head when the radical project 
collapsed and nihilism set in at the end of the 1970s and then blossomed 
in all its crassness and excess in the new millennium. Hedonism thus 
constitutes a through line of China’s revolutionary century. The 1989 
pro-democracy movement was but a last gasp of utopianism that 
momentarily sublimated its shadowy twin hedonism in the form of 
political liberalism—the outcry against official corruption boiled down 
to resentment against “the goods of hedonism unfairly enjoyed by some 
and denied to other” (8). To me, this account verges on the absurd in its 
reductiveness. In putting the complex tapestry of 20th-century Chinese 
history through the wringer of a monochromatic utilitarian philosophy 
according to which all human endeavors aim merely for the satisfaction of 
“sensuous needs” (12-13), the author is willfully blind to the all-consuming 
quests for national sovereignty, social justice, liberty, and individual rights 
and dignity (renge).
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the smaller self 小我 to the greater self 大我 and prioritizing national 
salvation over individual happiness seemed not only reasonable but 
positively welcomed by the post-May Fourth generation dealing 
with the fallout of the romantic experiment. The urgency of saving 
China from imperialist conquest was such that no personal sacrifice 
was too great. As a popular slogan put it rhetorically: “Where is home 
when the nation is no more?” 沒有國哪有家. And yet not everyone 
subscribed to this nationalist logic. Su Qing’s fellow Shanghai writer 
Zhang Ailing 張愛玲 published a novella called “Love in a Fallen 
City” 傾城之戀 (2006) in the 1940s about a young divorcee seeking 
in vain the security and contentment of home and hearth until the 
fall of Hong Kong makes it all possible for her. Reared in an 
aristocratic family, the heroine fears the stigma of déclassé attached 
to working women and deems a respectable remarriage her only 
lifeline. At her natal home where she has sought temporary refuge, 
she is endlessly needled with reminders of her not belonging there. 
At the news of her ex-husband’s untimely death, she is urged to 
return thither and assume the position of the chaste widow, which 
could restore her claim to financial support and old age care. Instead, 
she bravely throws herself into the game of love played by the dandies 
and flappers of Shanghai and Hong Kong. Yet just like Su Qing’s 
narrator who realizes with rueful resentment that an impecunious 
30-ish divorcee, however charming, has little to recommend herself 
on the marriage market, Zhang’s vivacious and beautiful heroine 
dallies with a wealthy overseas Chinese playboy with little hope of 
getting him to tie the knot with her—until the romantic merry-go-
round is put paid to by a tempest of bullets and artillery shells from 
the invading Japanese army. With no more dance balls and soirees to 
attend and so many daily chores and worries to occupy them, the pair 
settle down to domestic life and begin to live in earnest as husband 
and wife who are thankful to have each other. The heroine gets a 
taste of happiness for the first time in many years, no matter that 
thousands have perished in the battle that has brought down the 
city.
Zhang’s contrarian tale has troubled and fascinated countless 
readers and critics. It seems unconscionable that a woman should 
rejoice over her personal triumph amid death and destruction. Yet 
few other stories ever talk so audaciously back to the nationalist 
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diktat about the conjoined fate of home and nation: For a woman 
who is already rendered homeless by the patriarchal kinship system, 
the death of the nation 亡國 amounts to a wild card that could make 
her situation worse, or, in an ironic twist of fate, make her dream 
come true. Vernacular happiness could be made synchronous with 
the fate of the nation only if there were no hierarchies of gender and 
class and no conflict of interests and values, that is, if there was no 
human plurality. Zhang’s story makes it plain that even between a 
man and a woman in love, divergence in interests and goals can give 
rise to endless skirmishes. Who is to say which side has a greater 
claim to his or her vision of happiness? And when it comes to 
demanding sacrifice for the good of the nation, who is to say that the 
common good does not in fact serve only a privileged few? Who can 
know for certain that the greater good is worth all the unhappiness 
endured in its name and that it will ultimately redound to the benefit 
of all, equally and fairly? 
These were precisely the questions posed by the post-Mao 
generation reeling from the colossal sacrifices demanded of them by 
the party-state for the sake of a communist utopia. It came as a 
terrible revelation that the party did not know best, and that the 
abnegation of the smaller self had not brought in return a strong 
nation and a flourishing society. Bidding farewell to revolution, the 
Chinese embarked on the pursuit of vernacular happiness with a 
vengeance. In pointed defiance of the socialist service ethic, happiness 
was recast in personal, private, even unabashedly materialist terms: 
the joy of romantic love, pleasure of sensuality, satisfaction of a well-
paid job, admiration of peers, reward of good health, gratification of 
a cohesive family, security of owning one’s home, delights in art and 
entertainment, and thrills of a consumer lifestyle with its endless 
choices and possibilities. To be sure, conflict and disappointment 
invariably arose, but few were willing to return to the collectivist era 
when the state promised to remove such petty troubles by imposing 
a unified, transcendent vision of the good life. 
In the three decades of reform and opening up, the state has 
retreated from private life and renounced campaign-style politics. It 
has not only acquiesced to the post-Mao resurgence of vernacular 
happiness but is also actively fostering it through the deepening of 
market reforms and sponsorship of a consumerist economy that 
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delivers bread and circuses to the masses long starved for such humble 
pleasures. It even permits a degree of religious freedom, opening the 
space for the worship of ancestors, gods, and spirits and allowing 
people to frame their disparate visions of the good life in kinship 
and/or spiritual terms. But, above all, it is the Enlightenment-
inspired, renge-based, and subjective understanding of happiness 
that has made a triumphant comeback. In a kind of replay of the May 
Fourth discovery of the individual and celebration of free love and 
free marriage, the post-Mao discourse of happiness unfolds almost 
entirely in the context of reclaiming love, marriage, and family as the 
bedrock of human rights. With life’s meaning and purpose once 
again vested in the affairs of the heart, small wonder that by far the 
most numerous and most popular narratives, in both verbal and 
visual media, are dedicated to intimate, emotionally charged 
relationships between lovers, spouses, and parents and children. 
Although lexicographic and syntactic inertia has carried the 
connotation of good fortune into the contemporary usage of 
xingfu—as when the Chinese title of Will Smith’s 2006 film The 
Pursuit of Happyness becomes When Happiness Comes Knocking 當
幸福來敲門, China’s swelling ranks of the middle class have 
decidedly swapped fu-lu-shou for the American Dream and 
regarded the pursuit of happiness as a birthright and self-directed 
project and turned more readily to self-help guides and happiness 
gurus than to the gods or the government (Madsen 1995, Yang 
2014, Zhang 2014a).
Once happiness becomes an emotion, or “an ideal of 
uninterrupted good feelings” (McMahon 2006, 462), contemporary 
urban Chinese have also come to experience the same quandary that 
attends happyism. Noting the astonishing success of the “smiley 
face” worldwide and the imperative of constant good cheer, 
McMahon (2006) writes: “Who among us never smiles for the 
camera? A glance at the family photo album will confirm that our 
grandparents’ generation was seldom so quick to present itself in this 
light. And when we think that the smile of Mona Lisa, just five 
centuries old, was something of an anomaly and a shock in its time, 
we get an idea of how much we—how much the world—has changed” 
(464). Much of urban China can be included in the global “we” here. 
Taking stock of the exponential growth of the happiness industrial-
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academic-entertainment complex, Jackson Lears (2013) notes that 
“behind the facade of smiley-faced optimism, American culture 
seems awash in a pervasive sadness, or at least a restless longing for a 
sense of fulfillment that remains just out of reach.” In China too, just 
as vernacular happiness is granted relative free rein, depressive 
disorders are also on the rise, giving impetus to a regime of therapeutic 
governance with a global psychiatric industry peddling psychotropic 
drugs on its heels (Kleinman 2011, Yang 2014, Zhang 2014b)—a 
trend lamented by Ethan Watters (2010) in his ethnographical study 
of “the Americanization of mental illness” that privileges psycho-
pharmaceutical treatment in place of communal coping mechanisms.
Urban China seems light years from the rural society that 
Potter set foot on some 30 years ago where she was flummoxed by the 
inattention to emotion and reluctance to make much of it. Today 
emotion talk is positively deafening. Even in the absence of electoral 
politics, the social order is increasingly grounded in feelings—the 
elusive but incontestable nerve centers of vernacular happiness, 
increasingly manifested as “a deep and vulnerable desire…to be 
healed of the dissatisfactions of being human” (McMahon 2006, 
471). Although the state has not gone so far as to infuse a special 
“high”-inducing chemical in the drinking water to pacify the 
population as the Hong Kong author Chan Koon-chung 陳冠中
(2011) fantasizes in his post-apocalyptic novel The Fat Years 盛世─
中國2013, it has not shied away from playing the politics of 
happiness.5 Surveying the People’s Daily and China Daily, the official 
mouthpieces of the party, Anna Sun (2014) notes the sharp rise in 
the frequency with which “happiness” has appeared in article titles 
since 2000. She connects it to the reorientation of the national 
agenda from the relentless class struggle and developmentalism of 
5 Predictably, the paternalistic discourse of happiness has spawned much 
cynical mimicry and spoof. The renowned poet Bei Dao 北島 may have 
been the first practitioner of this genre when he entitled his claustrophobic 
short story about a totalitarian world “No. 13 Happiness Street” 幸福大
街13號 (1985). Other examples include The Happy Life of Chatterbox 
Zhang Damin 貧嘴張大民的幸福生活 (a novel by Liu Heng 劉恆, 
adapted for the big screen by Yang Yazhou 楊亞洲 in 1998 and the small 
screen in 2000 by Shen Haofang 沈好放), and the cheeky substitution of 
the character for sex 性 for the character for fortune 幸 in xingfu.  
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the Mao era to the goal of “modest prosperity” 小康, a term that 
resonates well with both the Confucian tradition of benevolent 
governance 仁政 and the folk cult of happiness. In a similar vein, 
Yanhua Zhang (2014b) approaches the “Yu Dan 于丹 
phenomenon”—referring to a college professor’s phenomenal 
success with a televised lecture series that packaged the Analects as a 
bible for “the happiness of the heart”—in light of the state’s effort to 
steer the national conversation in a neoliberal direction through its 
sponsorship of happiness-themed mass media programs and scholarly 
research projects, including the annual happiness survey published 
in the journal aptly named Modest Prosperity 小康. 
More recently, as an antidote to the global spread of the 
American Dream whose rabid individualist ethos has been blamed 
for many contemporary social ills, most notably economic inequality 
and social anomie, the state has proposed the “China Dream” 中國
夢. Individual Chinese are urged to dream, to desire, and to strive in 
their personal, idiosyncratic ways (within certain bounds, of course), 
but they are also to think of their dreams as somehow connected to 
something larger than atomistic selves and therefore more worthy 
and enduring (Denton 2014). That larger something is invariably the 
nation, specifically a rising China and the glory of being a citizen of a 
rich and powerful country commanding the respect and even 
deference of the rest of the world—precisely the kind of overarching 
framework of moral purpose that has been lost in America according 
to the authors of Habits of the Heart (Bellah et al. 1986, see also 
Madsen et al. 2001). Perhaps out of the recognition that happiness 
without the freedom of choice or happiness in the absence of justice 
is a false good (Zhou 2012), the state now pursues an indulgent, 
neoliberalized version of Huang Liuhong’s Confucian paternalism. 
Instead of prohibiting vernacular happiness for its anarchic or 
anomic tendencies, or requiring everyone to dream the same lofty 
dream, the state now merely nudges everyone toward something 
beyond themselves and their good feelings, if only to save them from 
their “glorious, but terrifying, isolation” (Bellah et al. 1986, 6). For 
those panting on the “hedonic treadmill,” a condition long familiar 
to the citizens of the affluent West where happiness has not grown 
proportionately with rising incomes after a certain threshold, this 
could even be a welcome reprieve.
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The China Dream is what Lydia Liu 劉禾 (2004) would call a 
“supersign,” born of the heterolinguistic, cross-cultural marriage 
between the century-old Chinese quest for recognition and 
preeminence in the global arena and the American Dream that still 
holds hegemonic sway despite its fraying edge. In its amorphous 
capaciousness, as William Callahan (2013) has documented recently, 
the China Dream may well break through its nationalist confines, as 
the American Dream has in the 20th century, and become amenable 
to cosmopolitan appropriations for the sake of planetary goals like 
combating climate change and implementing global justice. In that 
light, the motto of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, “One World, One 
Dream” 同一個世界同一個夢想, is both preposterous and audacious, 
both an affront to the liberal sensibility and a challenge to a 
dissentious world to dream a common future.
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